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I. INTRODUCTION
The most important developments in the human rights arena are now
occurring under the auspices of the European Union (EU). The expansion of
the EU to include several formerly totalitarian regimes, the adoption of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as well as the
discussions now taking place concerning a constitution for the EU, have
pushed human rights to the forefront of the EU agenda. Within the EU,
sweeping anti-discrimination Directives are now in place and funding for
human rights projects on an unprecedented scale has been allocated. These
developments could not have been anticipated when the EU was established
almost a half century ago.
In implementing the gender equality provision of the Treaty of Rome, the
EU borrowed heavily from the United States experience. The Treaty of
Amsterdam, adopted in 1999, expands the areas of prohibited discrimination
to include that based on racial or ethnic origin, religion or beliefs, disability,
age, or sexual orientation in addition to gender. This Article will examine the
new comprehensive initiatives of the EU with respect to human rights and anti-
discrimination and compare them to the United States civil rights law.
II. HISTORY
The EU, as is well known, was formed primarily to further market
integration.' As originally envisioned, human rights would be protected
through the individual member states and under mechanisms and agreements
established under the auspices of the Council of Europe (Council). Because
of their common heritage of political ideals, freedom and the rule of law, EU
member states, along with several other European states, had earlier adopted
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms and had provided for an elaborate enforcement mechanism for the
protection of human rights through what is known as the Strasbourg process.2
' Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty ofAmsterdam: The Next Step Towards Gender Equality?,
23 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 2 (1999); see also Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the
European System of Human Rights Protection: Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforce-
ment?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 313 (1998); Rebecca Means, Kalanke v. Freie
Hansestadt Bremen: The Significance of the Kalanke Decision on Future Positive Action
Programs in the European Union, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1087, 1110 (1997).
2 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Convention]. The European Court of Human
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The European Community (Community) was intended to be an institution of
limited competence, encompassing primarily economic concerns, and human
rights protection was left to existing institutions and individual member states.
Therefore, when the Treaty of Rome came into force in 1957, human rights
could be considered an afterthought. However, now through a series of
decisions by the ECJ, 3 Directives of the Council,4 Treaty revision,5 the
adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,6 and
the ongoing discussion of a new Constitution for the EU, the entrenchment of
human rights in the fabric of EU law has become a reality.
The Treaty of Rome,7 the founding document of the Community, contains
only one substantive provision pertaining to human rights. Ex-Article 119,
now Article 141, established the principle of equal pay for equal work based
on gender.8 However, even that provision was adopted because of economic
considerations rather than human rights considerations. It was inserted to
ensure that French social standards which required equality in the workplace
would not be diluted by membership in the common market and that France
Rights and the European Commission of Human Rights sit in Strasbourg, and individuals, as
well as member states, may take complaints of human rights violations directly before the court.
Jurisdiction over member states is compulsory. All member states of the EU and most potential
members, such as Russia and Macedonia, have ratified the Convention. The European Court of
Human Rights is separate and apart from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the other
mechanisms of the EU, such as the European Commission and the Council. See Leuprecht,
supra note 1, at 315-18.
1 See Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena,
1976 E.C.R. 455, 472 [hereinafter Defrenne II]; Case 14977, Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme
Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 1374 [hereinafter Defrenne III]
(stating that respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles of
Community law); Case 4/73, Nold, Kohlen-und BaustoffgroBhandlund v. Commission, 1974
E.C.R. 491; see also Philip Alston & J.H.H. Weiler, An 'Ever Closer Union' in Need of a
Human Rights Policy, 9 EUR. J.I.L. 658 (1998).
4 See, e.g., Equal Treatment Directive O.J. (L 29) 40 of 1976, Equal Pay Directive 75/117
1975.
S See Elizabeth F. Defeis, The Treaty of Amsterdam: The Next Step Towards Gender
Equality?, 23 B.C. INT'L&CoMp. L. REV. 1(1999).
6 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 20, available
at http://ue.eu.int/df/docs/en/CharteEN.pdf.
7 TREATYOFROME, Mar. 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ECTREATY]. Although the
EC Treaty contains a social chapterwhich deals with human rights to some extent and guarantees
workers' rights, its primary goal is to improve working conditions and standards of living on a
harmonized basis throughout the EU. But from its very inception, the EU has embodied the
principle of gender equality, at least concerning equal pay for men and women in employment.
I ld. art. 141.
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would not be placed at an economic disadvantage. However, Article 119 has
been the subject of voluminous EU legislation and litigation and has led to an
extensive body of case law. Indeed, the equal pay principle has developed into
a general equality right between men and women which exists at the core of
EU law.9
Under the leadership of the ECJ, the EU has developed a rich jurisprudence
of human rights law."0 Decisions of the ECJ have been bold and far-reaching
in the area of human rights and have undoubtedly influenced the subsequent
treaties that increasingly refer to human rights protections.
It has been said that the attention to human rights was a defensive measure
adopted by the Court to still the controversy over the newly articulated
doctrine of the supremacy of Community law articulated in the early 1960s.
The Court, in a bold move, held that community law as enunciated by the
Court takes precedence over domestic constitutions as well as over domestic
positive law."
Some member states, which had strong human rights provisions in their
constitutions, notably Germany and Italy, were uncomfortable with this
doctrine. They feared that the strong human rights provisions in their own
constitutions could be negated by Community law and hence resisted the
supremacy doctrine. 2 In the face of the judicial decision in Costa v. ENEC,
9 The Council adopted six Directives between 1975 and 1992: (1) the Equal Protection
Directive of 1975 [hereinafter EPD]; (2) the Equal Treatment Directive of 1976 [hereinafter
ETD]; (3) the 1978 Social Security Directive; (4) the 1986 Directive on equal treatment in
occupational social security schemes; (5) the 1986 Directive of equal treatment between men and
women engaged in an activity including agriculture in a self-employed capacity and on the
protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood; and (6) the 1992
Directive on the protection of pregnant women from exposure to hazardous substances in the
workplace and on rights to maternity leave. See Sonia Mazey, The European Union and
Women's Rights: From the Europeanization of the National Agendas to the Nationalization of
a European Agenda, 5 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 131, 140 (1998).
10 See generally Alston & Weiler, supra note 3; see also Leuprecht, supra note 1.
" Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1 7 (establishing the principle of supremacy
of Community law over the domestic law of member states in order to ensure application of
Community law throughout the community. However, the supremacy doctrine was met with
resistance from many member states, particularly in the area of human rights. Because the EEC
treaty contained very limited human rights provisions and the constitutions of the member states
contained human rights guarantees modeled on documents such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, it was unacceptable to some member states to implement community legislation
without scrutinizing it through the lens of their own constitutional guarantees of fundamental
rights.).
12 See Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTs OF MAN TODAY 32-33 (1978); see also
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starting in 1969, the Court, in a long line of cases, held that indeed human
rights considerations would be used to measure the validity of Community
law.' 3 The Court emphasized that general principles of law, inspiration from
the constitutions of member states, and provisions of international human
rights conventions would all be applied by the Court.'4
Among the rights recognized and enforced by the ECJ under this jurispru-
dence are freedom of expression, 5 freedom of association, 6 the right to
religion, 7 the right to property," the right to privacy,' 9 and the right to pursue
a business.2" The interpretation put on these rights by the ECJ did not always
accord with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in
Strasbourg. In areas such as privacy, gender discrimination and abortion, the
ECJ has taken a narrower approach than the ECHR or the Court has avoided
deciding the issue. 2' With the expanded jurisdiction of the ECJ to encompass
some human rights concerns, an interesting open question remains: Which
court is the ultimate arbiter of human rights? The Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg or the ECJ in Luxembourg? Clearly this is a question that requires
further attention and reflection.22
Bundesverfassungsgerichtshop, order of Oct. 18, 1967, BverfGE, 1967, 223.
1 See Defrenne 1I, supra note 3.
'4 See Alston & Weiler, supra note 3, at 709.
's See Joined Cases 43/82d 63/82 Vereniging ter Bevordering van het Vlaamse Boekwezen
v. Commission, 1984 E.C.R. 99.
16 Case 175/173, Geewerkschaftsbund v. Council, 1974 E.C.R. 917, 925.
17 Case 130/75, Prais v. Council, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 1599.
"s Case 44/79, Hauer v. Rheinland, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3745.
19 Case 136/79, National Panasonic Limited v. Commission. Competition: Investigations
by the Commission, 1980 E.C.R. 2033, 2056.
20 id.
21 See generally Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493, 535 (holding
that investigations by the military into an individual's sexual orientation constituted a direct
interference with the applicant's right to privacy and that "convincing and weighty reasons have
not been offered by the Government to justify the policy against homosexuals in the armed
forces"); Case 249/96, Grant v. South-West Trains, 1998 E.C.R. 1-621 (holding that prohibition
of discrimination based on sex, a fundamental principle of Community law, did not cover
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation). But see Niemietz v. Germany, 16 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 97 (1993) (holding that a "search of professional activities and premises" constitutes a
violation of the right to privacy); Case 46/87, Hoechst AG v. Commission, 4 C.M.L.R. 410
(1991) (holding that Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights is concerned
primarily with the development of individual's personal freedom and may not therefore be
extended to business premises).
22 In an attempt to avoid this conflict, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of
the European Union provides:
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The issue of human rights protections rose to the top of the agenda in the
1990s. There were increasing demands, particularly from the Parliament, that
the EU itself adopt a Charter of Fundamental Rights or that the Union accede
to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In
1996 the Council of the European Community requested the ECJ to give an
advisory opinion on Community accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights.23 Under the authority of Article 228(6) of the Treaty of Rome,
the Council asked the ECJ if the accession of the European Community to the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
would be compatible with the Treaty establishing the European Community.
The Court's answer was a resounding negative. It noted that no treaty
provision conferred any general power to the Community to enact rules
regarding human rights or the power to conclude the relevant international
conventions affirming Community institutions. The ECJ held that, absent
treaty revision, the EU could not accede to the European Convention,24 noting
that ratification of the Convention would bind the Community to the rulings
of the ECHR. Thus, the EU would have to share or surrender sovereignty with
another institution and this was unacceptable.25
III. HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES
A. Treaty of Amsterdam
The Treaty of Amsterdam, 26 adopted in 1999, provided the opportunity for
treaty revision which would allow the EU to ratify the European Convention
In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those
laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union
law providing more extensive protection.
See Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the European Union, supra note 6, art.
52(3).
23 Opinion 2/94, Re: The Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights
Convention, 1996 E.C.R. 1-1759.
24 id.
25 Id.
26 TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED AcTs, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J.
(C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter AMSTERDAM TREATY], incorporated into the TREATY ESTABuSH-
ING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 224) 1 (1992).
[Vol. 32:73
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on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, but no such revision was
included.27 At the same time, there were proposals to incorporate a bill of
rights into the treaties but these were not adopted.28 Instead, the Amsterdam
Treaty of 1999 contained significant provisions with respect to human rights
that heightened the profile of the EU as one based more visibly on human
rights. In addition, the EU now has both an internal and external human rights
policy.
First, Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 9 now states that
the EU as such is founded "on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law."30
Second, with respect to its external human rights policy, only those
European states that respect the principles set out under Article 6(1) may apply
to become members of the EU.3 '
Third, the criteria to be used in evaluating human rights issues are explicitly
articulated. The EU "shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the
European Convention on Human Rights . .. and as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the member states, as general principles
of Community law."32
Fourth, a new mechanism is provided to deal with member states that
persistently and seriously violate the principles set out in Article 6(1). 3 An
elaborate (and exclusively political) process is set out according to which the
relevant determinations are to be made. The sanction is the suspension of
certain rights, including voting rights of the member states concerned. The
political costs involved in invoking sanctions are formidably high and it should
be noted that this provision was not invoked against Austria in 2000. 31
27 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 2.
28 The Amsterdam Treaty is not a stand alone document but rather amends the EC treaty and
the Treaty on European Union. Consequently, the provisions of the EC Treaty have been
renumbered.
29 TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION [hereinafter TEU], Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. (C 191) 4 (1992). In
1992, the TEU, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht, amended the EC Treaty and created what
is now known as the EU. The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997, amends the TEU.
30 See AMSTERDAM TREATY art. 6.1.
31 Id. art. 49.
32 Id. art. 6.2.
33 Id. art. 7.
34 In October of 2000, J6rg Haider's Freedom Party received twenty-seven percent of the
popular vote during Austria's Parliamentary elections. Haider's extreme right-wing tendencies
and remarks prompted criticism from many EU leaders, along with the U.S. and Israel, although
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Perhaps the greatest expansion in the area of human rights is Article 13 of
the Treaty, which expanded the non-discrimination rules of the Treaty to
include other categories beyond gender discrimination. Article 13 provides
that
without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and
within the limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Commu-
nity, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, may
take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex,
racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual
orientation.35
The original gender equality provision was also expanded. In addition to
substantially incorporating the Equal Pay Directive of 1975, which adopted a
comparable worth standard,36 the Amsterdam Treaty adds two new provisions.
The first provision requires the Council, under qualified majority voting, to
adopt measures to ensure equal opportunity and equal treatment of men and
women in employment. 37 The second provision allows member states to adopt
and maintain positive action provisions. It states:
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between men
and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall
not prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting
measures providing for specific advantages in order to make it
easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in
professional careers.38
Although the term "under-represented sex" replaces the term "women" as the
focus of positive action, a declaration by member states stipulates that such
no formal proceedings or sanctions were filed against Austria. See Rod Usher, A Right Mess!
Jorg Haider's Freedom Party joins the Austrian Government and shakes up the EU, TIME MAG.
EUROPE, Feb. 14,2000.
5 Id. art. 13.
36 See Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L45) 19 (defining equal pay as "the same work
or for work to which equal value is attributed").
37 See EC Treaty, supra note 7, art. 141(3).
38 See AMSTERDAM TREATY, art. 119(4).
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action should in the first instance aim at improving the situation of women in
working life.39 This provision, therefore, implicitly rejects the holding of the
ECJ in Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Breman,4' which held that a positive
action program is only permitted with respect to access to employment, instead




Relying upon the competence set forth in Article 13, the Commission
introduced a set of fair measures in 1999. These included:
1. A Communication on Community measures to combat
discrimination;4'
2. A Directive to implement the "principle of equal treatment
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin";42
3. A Directive to establish a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation; 3 and
s Declaration 28 on Article 119(4) (now article 141(4)), AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note
26, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 136.
o Case C-450/93, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051. The ECJ held that a German state law that
guaranteed women automatic priority over men in the labor market was contrary to the ETD's
prohibition of sex-based discrimination. The decision was consistent with the purpose of the
ETD, which promotes the principle of "equal treatment for men and women as regards access
to employment." Several member states criticized the ruling as an obstacle to women's progress
toward achieving equality in the workplace. Subsequently, in Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen, Case C-409/95, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3051, the ECJ upheld the German law and recognized
that positive action limited to "providing occupational training and guidance for women or...
influencing the sharing of occupational and family responsibilities is not sufficient to put an end
to . . . partitioning of labor markets." See also Julie A. Mertus, International Decision:
Marschall v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 92 AM. J. INT'LL. 296,297 (1998); Equal Opportuni-
ties: Disagreements About How to Interpret Marschall Judgment, EUR. REP., Jan. 28, 1998.
"' Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Certain Community
measures to Combat Discrimination, 1999 O.J. (C 369) 3.
42 Council Directive 2000/43/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22 [hereinafter Race Directive].
41 Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 3003) [hereinafter Employment Directive].
20041
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4. A Decision to establish an action plan to combat discrimina
tion.44
Two landmark Directives have already been adopted on the basis of this
new competence. Additional Directives are planned with respect to discrimi-
nation based on gender, disability and age. The Directives already adopted are
sweeping in scope and would have been unprecedented when the community
was formed in 1957. Perhaps because of the political climate existing in
Europe, particularly the rise of J6rg Haider's Freedom party in Austria, the
Directives were adopted with unusual speed, particularly in the face of the
unanimity requirement set forth in Article 13.
The first Directive, which focuses on racial discrimination, pertains to
several spheres beyond the purely economic, such as housing and education,
and was adopted by the Council on June 29, 2000."5 The second, adopted by
the Council on November 27, 2000,' is confined to discrimination in the field
of employment, and covers all categories mentioned in Article 13 save for
gender (already covered under a web of EU Directives) and race, which now
has a stand-alone Directive. An "action programme" accompanies and
augments the legislative menu.47
Title VII of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964"' and decisions of
U.S. courts have been influential in the drafting of the equality legislation in
various member states as well as in decisions of the ECJ.49 This influence can
be detected as well in the Race and Employment Directives and also in the
prior Equal Treatment Directive, which was limited exclusively to gender
equality. As enacted in 1964, the Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination
on the basis of race, religion or national origin in various areas including
housing and public accommodations. Only Title VII, which prohibits
discrimination in all areas of employment, also includes gender as a protected
" See Council Communication (2001) 664.
4 Race Directive, supra note 42.
46 Employment Directive, supra note 43. Gender equality had already been addressed by
numerous measures adopted within the European Union and these measures are currently
undergoing reevaluation by the Commission. It is expected that a new Directive will issue
shortly.
47 Council Decision 2000/750, Establishing a Community Action Programme to Combat
Discrimination (2001 to 2006), 2000 O.J. (L. 303) 23.
4' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, Stat. 241 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2001)).
49 See, e.g., Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in Kalanke, supra note 40.
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group.5' Specifically, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to refuse to
hire, discharge, or "otherwise discriminate" against any individual, because of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5
Both Directives require as a minimum that the principle of non-discrimina-
tion be applied to "all persons, as regards both the public and private sectors"
in relation to employment, self-employment, working conditions, access to
vocational training and work experience, membership of workers', employers'
or professional organizations, areas traditionally within the competence of EU
activity and interest." The Employment Directive also requires member states
to introduce protection against discrimination on the grounds of religion or
belief, disability, age, sexual orientation, and racial or ethnic origin.53
The Race Directive provided several challenges in the drafting process.
Despite the preventive measures taken by the EU to prevent discrimination on
the grounds of social or ethnic origin within the EU,54 the Community rejected
the notion of separate "human races" and thus no definition of race is included
in the Directive.55 In addition to the areas specified in the Employment
Directive, the Race Directive also applies to education, social protection
(including social security and health care), social advantages (such as
concessionary fares and subsidized meals), and access to goods and services
which are available to the public (including housing).
Both Directives apply to any person who is within a member state when the
act of discrimination occurs. Thus they apply to non-nationals as well as
nationals of member states. However, the Directives clearly state that
discrimination based on nationality is outside their scope and cannot be used
to challenge conditions that a member state applies to the entry or residence of
1o 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (2001).
51 Id.
52 See Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 3(1); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art.
3(1).
3 See Employment Directive, supra note 43, para. 10.
s In 1995 the Commission presented a communication on racism, xenophobia and anti-
Semitism; in 1996 the Council adopted a Joint Action Plan, 96/443/JHA, 1996 O.J. (L 185) 7,
concerning action to combat racism and xenophobia under which the member states ensured
effective judicial cooperation in respect of offenses based on racist or xenophobic behavior; the
2000 Employment Guidelines adopted by the Council in 1999 and 2000 are aimed at combating
discrimination against groups such as ethnic minorities.
" The Council decision establishing the Community Action Programme to combat
discrimination stated: "The principle of equal treatment must apply irrespective of whether the
racial or ethnic origin is real or presumed." Council Decision 2000/750, supra note 47.
20041
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third-country nationals, and any treatment they receive as a result of their legal
status.
2. Prohibited Discrimination
The Directives forbid four forms of discrimination. They include direct and
indirect discrimination, harassment, and instruction to discriminate. Direct
discrimination is stated to occur "where one person is treated less favorably
than another is, has been, or would be treated in a comparable situation" on
one of the stated grounds.56 Indirect discrimination occurs when an apparently
neutral provision criterion or practice "would put [such person] at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons."57 Thus it is not necessary to prove
that a person was actually discriminated against; rather it is sufficient to prove
that the practice or the provision would put the affected person at a particular
disadvantage. This rejects the approach previously taken in the gender
equality area where statistical evidence was required to support a claim of
indirect discrimination, but rather follows the approach of the ECJ with respect
to discrimination in the area of free movement of persons." A person claiming
discrimination need not prove motive or rely on statistical evidence to support
the claim. The burden of proving discrimination, after a prima facie case of
discrimination has been presented, shifts to the respondent to prove that
discrimination has not occurred. Burden of proof is an important component
of such litigation.
The prohibited direct and indirect discrimination corresponds to the two
theories of discrimination that have emerged under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, namely, disparate treatment and disparate impact.
A prima facie case of disparate treatment is made when an individual
proves he or she: (1) was qualified for the position under dispute, or was
56 Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(2)(a); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art.
2(2)(a).
"' Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(2)(b); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art.
2(2)(b).
5 See Case C-237/94, O'Flynn v. Adjudication Officers, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2617, stating
[C]onditions imposed by national law must be regarded as indirectly
discriminatory where, although applicable irrespective of nationality, they
affect essentially migrant workers... or the great majority of those affected
are migrant workers ... where they are indistinctly applicable but can more
easily be satisfied by national workers than by migrant workers... or where
there is a risk that they may operate to the particular detriment of migrant
workers (citations omitted).
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performing his or her job at a level that rules out the possibility of firing for
inadequate job performance; (2) was not hired, or suffered some other adverse
job action by the employer; and (3) someone with roughly equivalent
qualifications was hired instead of him or her, or replaced him or her.59 If the
plaintiff meets the burden of proving that the employer has discriminated
against him or her, the employer's only defense in a disparate treatment case
is to prove that a discrimination on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin requirement or restriction is a bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception, which is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
its business. While a number of different tests for the BFOQ defense exist,
basically the defense requires the employer to show that the "essence of the
business operation would be undermined" by hiring employees without the
qualification in question.'
The concept of the disparate impact theory was first articulated in the
United States in the landmark decision of Griggs v. Duke Power Company,
where the United States Supreme Court acknowledged that discriminating
conduct need not be direct or overt in order to be considered as a form of
disparate treatment.6' In Griggs the employer, Duke Power Company, required
both a high school diploma and passing scores on a general aptitude test as a
prerequisite of employment. These requirements applied to all departments
except for the lowest one. Although the practice appeared neutral on its face,
the Supreme Court held that it served as a pretext for discrimination and
ultimately resulted in excluding a protected group from a justifiably equal
employment opportunity.62 Namely, the high school diploma requirement
disproportionately excluded black applicants from employment at Duke Power
Company because the graduation rate in North Carolina reflected racial
disparity.63
As a result of the Griggs decision, today Title VII proscribes conduct that
is "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation."' Thus, in disparate impact
cases under Title VII, the plaintiff need not establish the employer's motive or
intent in implementing the employment selection process. Instead, the plaintiff
59 KATHERINE BARTLET & ANGELA HARRIS, GENDER AND THE LAw: THEORY, DOCrRiNE,
COMMENTARY 165 (2d ed., 1998).
6 Id. at 166 (quoting Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
61 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
(2 Id. at 428-29.
63 id.
6 Id. at 431.
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must introduce specific proof to establish the disproportionate impact.
Moreover, when such disparate impact occurs, it is the employer's burden to
demonstrate that the requirements in the selection process are related to the job
being sought and governed by principles of business necessity. Unlike
discriminatory impact cases brought under the U.S. Constitution, the plaintiff
need not show discriminatory intent.65
The third type of prohibited discrimination is harassment. This is the first
time in a Community Directive that harassment has been stated as a form of
discrimination. However, the type of harassment prohibited in both the
Employment and the Race Directives goes far beyond sexual harassment,
which has been the subject of study and proposals throughout the EU.'
The concept of sexual harassment as a basis for setting forth a violation of
legal rights to non-discrimination was first articulated by Catherine McKinnon
in the 1960s and accepted by the courts in the United States as a basis for
alleging a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Later, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency
charged with implementing Title VII, declared sexual harassment to be a
violation of federal law and defined sexual harassment as follows:
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
67environment.
A hostile work environment arises when a co-worker or supervisor,
engaging in unwelcome and inappropriate sexually based behavior, renders the
See id.; see also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(3); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art.
2(3). See also EUROPEAN COMM'N, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT THE WORKPLACE IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION (1998) (summarizing the Commission's review of research conducted by
eleven member countries into sexual harassment in employment in the Community).
67 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985).
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workplace atmosphere intimidating, hostile, or offensive.6" Under the EEOC
guidelines, employers are liable when either their supervisors or agents create
a hostile environment, if the employer knew or should have known of the
sexual harassment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action.69 According to the EEOC, employers are usually deemed to know of
sexual harassment if it is: (1) openly practiced in the workplace; (2) well-
known among employees; or (3) brought to the employer's notice by a victim's
filing a charge.7' The adoption of the concept of a hostile work environment
has required an extensive review of employment conditions throughout the
United States and the implementation of training or education programs on
sexual harassment for both employers and employees."
The issue of sexual harassment has attracted much attention throughout the
Community.72 As a result, in September 2002, the EU published a new
Directive which amends the Equal Treatment Directive (ETD) on the
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women with
regard to access to employment, vocational training and promotion and
working conditions.73 The 2002 Directive amends the ETD in accordance with
case law, treaty changes and recent EU legislative proposals in the area of
discrimination. The 2002 Directive provides that sexual harassment in the
workplace constitutes discrimination on the ground of sex and defines sexual
harassment as follows: "Where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of
violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an intimidating,
hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment." '74
In addition, the Directive requires that "member states shall encourage, in
accordance with national law... employers and those responsible for access
to vocational training to take measures to prevent all forms of discrimination
on grounds of sex, in particular harassment and sexual harassment at the
68 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57 (1986).
69 EEOC, PoLIcY GUIDANCE ON CURRENT ISSUES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT, Notice No. N-
915-050 (1990).
70 Id.
71 See Claudia Withers, Preventing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 587 PLI, LIT 109,
115 (1998).
72 See Comm'n Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and Council Amending
Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 2000 O.J. (L 337) 204.
73 Council Directive 2002/73/EC of 23 September 2002 Amending the 1976 Directive on
Equal Treatment of Men and Women, 2002 O.J. (L 269) 15.
74 Id. art. 2(2).
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workplace. 75 Further, member states are urged to "encourage employers to
promote equal treatment for men and women in the workplace in a planned and
systematic way" and "to provide at appropriate regular intervals employees
and/or their representatives with appropriate information on equal treatment
for men and women in the undertaking."76
Clearly, the United States experience in developing the concept of hostile
work environment and placing responsibility for education and training on the
employer has been influential.
In both the Race Directive and the Employment Directive, the concept of
harassment is expanded to encompass "unwanted conduct related to any of the
grounds covered by the Directives, or conduct which is intended, or has the
effect of, violating an individual's dignity and creating a humiliating,
intimidating or hostile environment."77
Thus, not only is the range of actions expanded, but also the actors who
might be affected by the Directives are expanded to include, for example,
individual patients or clients.78 The unwanted conduct need not be of a sexual
nature but rather is based on a violation of dignity and the creation of a hostile
environment. However, the Directives do not specifically address the question
of liability of employers or service providers for allegational conduct that they
did not initiate. Rather, the Directives allow member states a wide discretion
in determining the full scope of the ban on harassment.79
Clearly, the type of activity deemed harassment under the Directives is
broader in scope than the U.S. model, which focuses exclusively on sexual
harassment. However, they borrow from the United States model and adopt
the concept of hostile environment as a form of harassment.
Finally, the Directives prohibit instructions to discriminate. This ban is
particularly important since it appears that employers in the past have placed
pressure on employment agents not to send workers of a particular ethnic
origin.80
75 Id. art. 2(5).
76 Id. art. 8(b)(3) & (4).
71 See Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 2(3); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art.
2(3).
" See Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 2(3); Race Directive, supra note 42, art.
2(3).
7' Both Article 2(3) of the Race Directive and Article 2(3) of the Employment Directive
provide "the concept of harassment may be defined in accordance with the national laws and
practice of the Member States."
80 MARK BEt, ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 76 (2002).
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Both Directives include protection against retaliation, or, as it is called in
the Directives, "victimization," as a consequence of complaining of discrimi-
nation or bringing or taking part in discrimination proceedings."' Similar
provisions exist in the United States civil rights law with respect to employ-
ment discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects individuals who
have "made a charge, testified, asserted or perpetrated in any manner in an
investigation, providing or hearing" under the Act, and protects individuals
who have "opposed any practice made unlawful" by the Act. 2
3. Derogations
Both the Employment Directive and the Race Directive contain several
derogations and exceptions. Discrimination is permitted if it is a "genuine and
determining occupational requirement." 3 However, a more limited list of
occupational requirements is found in the Race Directive than in the Employ-
ment Directive. Thus, the Race Directive states:
Member states may provide that a difference of treatment which
is based on a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin shall
not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of
the particular occupational activities concerned or of the context
in which they are carried out, such a characteristic constitutes a
genuine and determining occupational requirement, provided that
the objective is legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. 4
This provision is replicated in the Employment Directive.85 Further, the
Employment Directive allows states additional leeway and permits "churches
and other public or private organizations the ethos of which is based on
religion or belief' ' 6 to discriminate on the grounds of religion, where, based
on the occupational activities at issue or the context in which they are carried
out, "a person's religion or belief constitute a genuine, legitimate and justified
occupational requirement," 7 provided that it does notjustify discrimination on
" Race Directive, supra note 42, para. 20; Employment Directive, supra note 43, para. 30.
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000.
'3 Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 4(1); Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 4.
84 Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 4.
83 Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 4(1).
86 Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 4(2).
87 id.
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another ground. These organizations can also require "individuals working for
them to act in good faith and with loyalty to the organization's ethos.""8 Thus,
a religious school may require a teacher to be of that faith. However, the
extent to which a person must conform to a code of behavior remains unclear.
Both the United States' experience under Title VII and experience gained
in connection with equal treatment based on gender are apparent in this
definition. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains the bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception, which allows "an employer to
hire and employ employees ... on the basis of his religion, sex, or national
origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise. "89 The BFOQ has been
interpreted narrowly to ensure "that individuals [are] considered on the basis
of individual capacities and not on the basis of any characteristics generally
attributed to the group."' Thus, the United States, while allowing for a BFOQ
exception on the basis of gender, does not permit it on grounds of race.
Specific derogations are also provided in the Employment Directive with
respect to disability, age, religion, or belief.9'
With respect to disability, the Employment Directive requires employers
to make reasonable accommodations for disabled persons. 92 Thus, employers
shall "take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable
a person with a disability to have access to, participate in, or advance in
employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would impose a
disproportionate burden on the employer."93 Disability is not defined in the
Directive. The area of disability discrimination is comparatively new both in
the United States and Europe and continues to evolve. The United States
federal law, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed in 1990
and in general provides "reasonable accommodations" for a worker's
88 Id.
19 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e)-2 (e)(1).
90 See 29 CFR § 1604.2 (1985); see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331-32
(1977); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187,201 (1991); Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex
Privacy and the Limits of Anti-Discrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257 (2003).
"' Council Directive 2000/78/EC, ch. III, art. 15, para. 1, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16,21 (noting
in respect of Northern Ireland, special provision is made concerning teachers and "under
representation of one of the major religious communities in the police service of Northern
Ireland." The Northern Ireland context allows for additional derogation.).
92 See Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 5.
9' See id.
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disability.94 Under the ADA, an employer must provide reasonable accommo-
dations where an individual's disability impedes his or her job performance,
unless to do so would impose an undue hardship on the employer. Because of
its scope and impact, the ADA is the subject of numerous regulations and
lawsuits affecting potentially forty-three million Americans who have mental
or physical disabilities.95
It is anticipated that a separate Directive on disability will soon be issued
to complement the Employment Directive. A draft disability-specific Directive
prepared by the European Disability Forum (EDF)96 is already in place.97 The
goal of this Directive is to "lay down a framework for combating discrimina-
tion on the ground of disability, with a view to putting into effect in the
Member States the principle of equal treatment."98 The draft notes that
disability "arises out of a relationship between the environment and physical,
intellectual, sensory, psychological, communication or development impair-
ment or chronic illness." 99 The draft covers four broad categories. These
include: (1) social protection including social security and health care; (2)
social advantages; (3) education; (4) access to, including conditions regulating
access, and supply of goods, services and information which are available to
the public, including transportation, the communications environment, the built
environment, banking and insurance and housing. When the draft of the
proposed Disability Directive is finalized, the EDF will submit it to the
European Commission and recommend the Commission to officially propose
a Directive.
The Employment Directive also permits derogations with respect to age,
provided they are "objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim,
including legitimate employment policy, labour market, and vocational training
objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and
necessary."'" Such differences may include fixing maximum and minimum
9 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2001).
" See Suzanne Abram, The Americans with Disabilities Act in Higher Education: The Plight
of Disabled Faculty, 32 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2003).
96 The EDF is a European association mostly funded by the European Union. One of EDF's
main objectives, on behalf of European NGOs and European national and local disability
organizations, is to achieve a disability-specific Directive based on Article 13 of the EC Treaty.
97 See PROPOSAL FOR A DIRECTIVE IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES
FOR PERSONS WITH DISABIrl, ch. 1, art. 1 (Draft 2002), available at http://www.edf-feph.org/
apdg/Documents/EDF%20disability%20directive.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
98 Id.
Id. para. 8.
'o See Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 6.
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ages for access to employment and dismissal and access to occupational social
security schemes.
Although the Employment Directive allows age discrimination to be
justified in some instances through derogations, it requires all member states
to introduce legislation prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination at work
on the grounds of age.'0 1 The challenge for member states in implementing
such legislation, however, is in identifying those differences of treatment that
are acceptable and those that are not. Extensive research and consulting
among member states and the Commission are now underway to resolve these
issues prior to the promulgation of the age-specific Directive.
In addition to these more specific exceptions, the Employment Directive
contains a general, wide-ranging exception not found in the race or sex
Directives, derived from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms.'l 2 This provides that the
Directive shall be without prejudice to measures laid down by
national law which, in a democratic society, are necessary for
public security, for the maintenance of public order and the
prevention of criminal offences, for the protection of public
health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.0 3
It has been noted that "unless the Court of Justice is vigilant, there is a risk that
this derogation could be used by Member States to perpetuate discrimination"
and "historically, stereotypical assumptions about gay men, Jews, Muslims,
and people with mental disabilities have been used to justify their exclusion
from certain jobs in the interest of national security or public health, or to
protect others from these 'dangerous' people."'"
Affirmative action, or as it is called, positive action, is specially permitted
as a derogation. After doubts about the compatibility of affirmative action
with the equality principle in the treaties were raised before the ECJ, the
Commission issued a communication to the Council and the Parliament stating
101 Id. art. 18.
,02 See Convention, supra note 2.
103 Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 2(5).
,o4 Catherine Barnard, The Changing Scope of Fundamental Principle of Equality, 46
McGaL L.J. 955, 972-73 (2001) (citing P. Skidmore, EC Framework Directive on Equal
Treatment in Employment: Towards a Comprehensive Community Anti-discrimination Policy?,
30 INDUS. L.J. 126, 130 (2001)).
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that a consensus exists in the EU that "the concept of positive action embraces
all measures which aim to counter the effects of past discrimination, to
eliminate existing discrimination and to promote equality of opportunity
between women and men, particularly in relation to types or levels of jobs
where members of one sex are significantly under-represented." ' 5  The
Council has identified a wide range of positive action measures which can be
adopted, including goals and timetables. The Amsterdam Treaty specifically
addressed positive action in relation to gender. 0 6 Both the Employment and
Race Directives recognize that equal treatment may not be sufficient to
overcome the weight of accumulated disadvantage experienced by discrimi-
nated groups and permit member states to take positive action measures to
"prevent or compensate for" situations of inequality. 07
The development of positive action in the EU was clearly influenced by the
United States experience.' 8 Curiously, while the United States has retreated
significantly from its endorsement of affirmative action, the EU, through the
Amsterdam Treaty and the subsequent Directives, has now firmly established
the legitimacy of affirmative action.
Both the Race Directive and the Employment Directive follow the pattern
of EU gender equality by facilitating positive action without placing any
obligation on member states to adopt such measures. It is anticipated that the
new gender equality Directive will address this issue with more specificity.
Further, because of the wide scope of the Race Directive, it would seem that
positive action could now be permitted in areas beyond employment, such as
housing and education.
Article 7(2) of the Employment Directive, however, seems to negate the
possibility of positive action for disability.' °9 It provides that states can
105 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council
on the Interpretation of the judgment of the Court of Justice on 17 October 1995 in Case C-
450/93, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, COM (96) 88 final.
106 AMSTERDAM TREATY, supra note 26.
107 See Employment Directive, supra note 43, para. 26; Race Directive, supra note 42, para.
17.
"o' See Kalanke, supra note 40. In his opinion, Advocate General Tesauro noted that the
positive action attempts to eliminate the obstacles affecting a particular disadvantaged category
of individuals in the labor market. He recognized the necessity for positive action programs and
described positive action programs as "a means of achieving equal opportunities for minority
or... disadvantaged groups, which generally takes place through the granting of preferential
treatment to the groups in question" for a "collective vision of equality." Tesauro reviewed the
rationale for positive action and cited numerous United States sources. Id.
109 See Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 7(2).
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derogate from the equality principle in respect of health and safety at work or
facilitates for safeguarding or promoting their integration into the working
environment.
4. Implementation
Human rights protection requires the acceptance of norms of human rights,
acceptance by states of legally binding obligations, and implementation of such
rights. In both the international and regional contexts, implementation has
proved to be the most problematic. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
have played a significant, although sometimes non-official, role in implement-
ing protection and standards in the EU, particularly in the area of gender
equality. The recent Directives now give NGOs an articulated role in their
enforcement. They also empower NGOs to support complainants or to bring
proceedings on behalf of complainants. Thus, the Directives provide that:
Member States shall ensure that associations, organisations or
other legal entities, which have, in accordance with the criteria
laid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring
that the provisions of this Directive are complied with, may
engage, either on behalf or in support of the complainant, with
his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative proce-
dure provided for the enforcement of obligations under this
Directive."to
The United States' class action rules, which are often developed and guided
by NGOs, have been pivotal in the development of civil rights law in the
United States. The role of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) in developing and strategizing the maj or civil rights
cases is well-known. The NAACP was central in facing the legal and political
struggles that culminated in the decision of Brown v. Board of Education,"'
a class action lawsuit involving state-imposed school segregation. The various
efforts of the NAACP, such as conducting research on the damaging
psychological effects of segregation, influenced the Supreme Court in Brown
Race Directive, supra note 42, art. 7(2); Employment Directive, supra note 43, art. 9(2).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 32:73
EQUALITY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
to strike down the concept of "separate but equal" and provided the legal
foundation of the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s. 2
Similarly, the role of NGOs in the United States has also been prominent
in the area of capital punishment. For example, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) opposes capital punishment without exception, arguing that
capital punishment violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual
punishment, is administered arbitrarily and unfairly, and fails to deter crime or
improve public safety. Through the ACLU's Capital Punishment Project, a
public education and advocacy program that seeks to bring about the abolition
of the death penalty, the United States has limited its use of the death
penalty. 3
Of particular importance in the Race Directive is a provision with potential
far-reaching impact that imposes an obligation on each member state to
designate a body to promote racial equality. The Directive provides that such
bodies should have powers to assist victims of discrimination to pursue their
complaints, conduct independent surveys concerning discrimination, and
publish independent reports with recommendations relating to such discrimina-
tion." 4 The Directive, however, does not require the establishment of an
equivalent agency at the EU level to coordinate such efforts.
In the United States, the agency charged with administration and enforce-
ment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act is the EEOC, a five-person board
appointed by the president. The EEOC is charged with enforcing the act
through suits filed in its name or through intervention in actions filed by
private plaintiffs. 5 Before proceeding to litigate, a plaintiff must file a charge
with the EEOC, and if probable cause is established, the EEOC must attempt
to resolve the claim through the informal means of conciliation and persuasion.
Only if this is unsuccessful may a claimant file suit." 6 The EEOC is vested
with broad subpoena power and can require employers to keep statistics and
records. Finally, the EEOC is charged with interpreting the Act and issuing
wide ranging interpretive guidelines regulations. These regulations have been
issued with respect to sexual harassment and discrimination based on religion,
age, and national origin.
112 id.
"1 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution of mentally
retarded criminals violates the 8th Amendment of the Constitution).
114 Race Directive, supra note 42, para. 24.
11 42 U.S.C. § 2000, § 706(b).
116 42 U.S.C. § 2000, § 706(b).
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Clearly, the EEOC has been instrumental in the effectiveness of Title VII.
The lawsuits brought by the EEOC based on a pattern or practice of discrimi-
nation throughout an industry have had far reaching effects. Suits have been
brought against AT&T" 7 and Sears, Roebuck & Company "8 and, in some
cases, have resulted in consent decrees which incorporated goals and
timetables to remedy imbalances in the workforce." 9  The Civil Rights
Commission, on the other hand, which has a broader mandate, has no
enforcement power. 20
In order to strengthen the effectiveness of the Directives, member states are
required to publicize widely both their existing laws on equal treatment and
non-discrimination in the areas within each of the Directives, as well as any
new measures they adopt to bring their laws in line with the Directives.
Member states are required to introduce or amend existing laws and proce-
dures to comply with the Directives. Compliance with the Race Directive was
required by July 19, 2003, and with the Employment Directive, in relation to
religion and sexual orientation, by December 2, 2003. With respect to the
more problematic categories of discrimination based on disability and age,
compliance is required by December 2006.
"'7 See EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735 (C.A. Pa. 1974) (requiring AT&T to implement
affirmative action programs in order to promote equal employment opportunities to minorities
and women).
" See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that
employer's failure to hire applicant of Hispanic descent violated Title VII).
119 Id.
"2 The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has the following mandate: 1) Investigate
complaints alleging that citizens are being deprived of their right to vote by reason of their race,
color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin, or by reason of fraudulent practices; 2)
Study and collect information relating to discrimination or a denial of equal protection of the
laws under the Constitution because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national
origin, or in the administration of justice; 3) Appraise federal laws and policies with respect to
discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws because of race, color, religion, sex, age,
disability, or national origin, or in the administration of justice; 4) Serve as a national
clearinghouse for information in respect to discrimination or denial of equal protection of the
laws because of race, color, religion, sex, age, disability, or national origin; 5) Submit reports,
findings, and recommendations to the President and Congress; and 6) Issue public service
announcements to discourage discrimination or denial of equal protection of the laws. See U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, at http://www.workplacefaimess.org/federalagencies.php.
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TV. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Despite proposals to include a Charter of Rights in the Treaty of Amster-
dam, no elaboration of rights was included. However, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights, adopted at the Nice Summit in December 2000, is another
milestone in the development of EU law in the area of equality.'21 The Charter
contains seven chapters: (1) Dignity, (2) Freedoms, (3) Equality, (4) Solidarity,
(5) Citizens' Rights, (6) Justice, and (7) General Provisions.'22 The Equality
Chapter prohibits "[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief,
political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property,
birth, disability, age or sexual orientation."' 2 3 Thus, the grounds for prohibited
discrimination are greater than those stated in Article 13 of the Amsterdam
Treaty.
The Charter is a declaration with political force but no legal force. It is
addressed to the Institutions of the Union and to the member states only when
they are implementing EU law. The Charter expressly states that the Charter
does not "establish any new power or task for the Community or the Union, or
modify powers and tasks defined by the Treaties."'24 But, the ECJ, which in
the past has taken a proactive role with respect to human rights issues, might
use this instrument as a guide to general principles of Community law which
it is directed to apply. Indeed, in many ways, the Charter itself has many
similarities to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that was
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1948.125 At the time that the UDHR
was adopted, it was not a legally binding document but was considered a
standard towards which all nations would aspire. Nevertheless, it gave
impetus to the adoption of legally binding documents including the European
Convention on Human Rights and now has a legal force of its own.
The standards set forth in the Charter exceed international standards in
several respects, particularly with respect to the social provisions. On other
occasions, they seem to fall below such standards. However, in order to assure
that the protections set out in the Charter do not in any way dilute international
1' Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 6; European Council,
Presidency Conclusions: Nice European Council Meeting, 7,8, and 9 December 2000, available
at http:lleuropa.eu.int/comm/nice-council/pdf/concl-en.pdf.
' Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 6, para. 5 1-54.
2 Id. art. 21(1).
214 See id.
" G.A. Res. 217A (111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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protections, which may be stronger than those in the Charter, the Charter states
that nothing in the Charter should be interpreted as restricting rights as
established under international law. Furthermore, in an effort to harmonize
with the European Convention on Human Rights, the Charter states that those
rights in the Charter which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention
shall have the same meaning and scope.'26 It should also be noted that by far
the largest section, Solidarity, deals with economic, social, and cultural rights.
This is especially significant since these rights do not correspond with any
existing competences at the level of the EU.
V. CONCLUSION
The EU has benefited from the concept of "equal pay for equal work,"
which began as an economic incentive and has evolved into a reaffirmation of
human rights in all areas of Union activity that goes well beyond economic
concerns. This commitment to human rights protection now has textual
support in the Treaty and sweeping Directives have been adopted. But
experience with the gender equality provisions in the Treaty of Rome and the
Directives adopted pursuant to its provisions indicates that implementation is
the key. The new anti-discrimination Directives and the action programme are
but a first step. However, the ECJ and the Commission must continue to
encourage member states to fully implement the new nondiscrimination
provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty and the Directives. Although in the past
the equality Directives were viewed from a market integration perspective
rather than a social policy perspective, it is clear that human rights is now a
complete and comprehensive concern and pillar of the European Union.
26 Charter of Fundamental Rights, supra note 6, art. 52(3).
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